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ABSTRACT
This culminating experience project explored current and up-and-coming
forms of authentication in association to secure wearable devices. The increase
in scams and associated vulnerabilities cause additional stress on the ability to
identify and authenticate devices and individuals. The research questions posed
in this project are: “What are the limitations of a wearable device actively
participating in a cryptographic exchange?” and “How can the relationship
between Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) and Internet of Things (IoT) influence the
future of secure wearable authentication?” The limitations of a wearable device
actively participating in a cryptographic exchange are the battery, computational
mass, and overall wearable size. The influence Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) and
Internet of Things (IoT) has over the future of secure wearable authentication
was examined with different types of light-weight authentication schemes such as
Single-Sign On (SSO). The research into IoT and secure wearable devices found
that there were many parallels between IoT and secure wearable devices. These
parallels furthered the concept of computational and battery capacity balancing,
as if one goes up, so does the other, and vise-versa. This project then explored a
new form of authentications scheme titled Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) in hopes
of providing a light-weight alternative to current authentications standards. An
example scenario was developed within this project to compensate for the lack of
standards associated with the delivery of SSI to an organization. This example
aims to provide a high-level overview of how SSI can potentially work when
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applied to an organized structure that supports it. This project then concluded
that it is possible to implement non-blockchain variants of SSI to an organization
with the added structure of secure wearable devices being utilized as a
communication medium.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research paper is made possible thanks to those who have supported
me throughout my journey into the world of cybersecurity. While it was not a path
I ever expected to take, I am thankful for being surrounded by amazing
individuals that pushed me towards my goals. I am forever in debt to those of you
who helped me get to where I am today.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................... v
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1
Background of Study.................................................................................. 1
Organization .............................................................................................. 3
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................ 4
Internet of Things ....................................................................................... 4
Single Sign On ........................................................................................... 5
Cryptographic Protocol Development ........................................................ 6
Wearable Authentication ............................................................................ 7
Self-Sovereign Identity ............................................................................... 7
CHAPTER THREE: WEARABLE DEVICE LIMITATIONS .................................. 10
CHAPTER FOUR: SECURE WEARABLE AUTHENTICATION THROUGH SSI 18
Understanding SSI ................................................................................... 18
SSI Scenario Development ...................................................................... 24
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ................................... 36
REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 38

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Decentralized Identification Model ....................................................... 20
Figure 2. Step 0 – Preliminary Registering of DID Documents ........................... 25
Figure 3. NSA DID Document Registration ........................................................ 26
Figure 4. Device DID Document Registration ..................................................... 27
Figure 5. Step 1 – Request and Issuance of Verifiable Credentials.................... 28
Figure 6. Issued Verifiable Credentials from NSA to WD ................................... 30
Figure 7. Step 2 – Verifiable Presentation .......................................................... 32
Figure 8. Verifiable Presentation from WD to Navy ............................................ 34

v

CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Background of Study
The process of authentication requires the identification of an entity and its
identity (Mare et al., 2018). This process actively associates principles to
principles for authorization to occur. Authentication can be achieved through
several factors: Something you know (e.g., password), something you have (e.g.,
token), or something you are (e.g., biometrics). These factors are vulnerable on
their own but are fundamentally strong when put in pairs (e.g., something you are
and something you have). Pairing two factors together increases the likelihood of
reducing potential vulnerabilities associated with authenticating resources. It has
then been recommended that this two-factor authentication (2FA) be utilized to
strengthen the resistance to known authentication vulnerabilities (Huang & Guo,
2021).
The utilization of touch-based authentication (something you have) is
prevalent within many organizations. An informal research venture conducted by
students participating in the Information Security Research and Education
(INSuRE) program at California State University, San Bernardino sought to
develop a generalized authentication scenario and custom cryptographic protocol
(Luna et al., 2021). This project was presented to eighty individuals from different
agencies and universities. This development was created to identify issues within
identifying employees. The advancement of cybersecurity threats and
1

vulnerabilities has made it increasingly difficult to identify an identity employee.
This project was to address the implementation of seamless wearable
authentication by a user to decrease potential vulnerabilities in authentication.
The project dubbed “SWAG: Secure Wearable Authentication Gear” was
proposed by Dr. Joshua Guttman (2021). Dr. Guttman had a direct oversight of
the project and guided the research in the direction he saw fit to their idea. The
problem posed for this project was to identify a means of employee identification
and validation through custom cryptographic protocols. This was directly
influenced by the increase in difficulty associated to cybersecurity threats and
system vulnerabilities. The researchers completed a generalized scenario with
the inclusion of alternative authentication paths for those with disabilities (Luna et
al., 2021). This scenario development framed the requirements for the custom
cryptographic protocol. The researchers then developed the goal of identifying a
secure means of message flow between the following four devices: Wearable
device, turnstile, database, and workstation. This message flow was later
visualized by utilization of the Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer (CPSA)
provided by Dr. Guttman. This collaboration led to the refinement of message
flow and interactions by the researchers.
The SWAG project attempted to answer if there was a possibility of
creating a custom cryptographic protocol, if even a generalized form, to minimize
vulnerability and attack vectors. This is theoretically possible but not without
extreme taxation on the need to create a protocol ground-up. The purpose of this
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research is to approach the prior SWAG topics from a perspective of
generalization and how it could be applied to an organization. The researchers
found that a real-world context should be adhered to. That context would lead to
a development of security measures that would be focused on to reduce
vulnerabilities. This culminating project will expand on this idea of seamless
wearable authentication and aim to answer the following questions:
1. What are the limitations of a wearable device actively participating in a
cryptographic exchange?
2. How can the relationship between Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) and
Internet of Things (IoT) influence the future of secure wearable
authentication?

Organization
This project is organized as follows: Chapter two will discuss prior
research and provide a literature review to give background on the topics
discussed. Chapter three will address the questions the limitations of wearable
devices and how they relate to IoT devices. Chapter four will approach SSI and
its relationship to IoT device and how it can influence the future of secure
wearable devices. Lastly, chapter five will provide a conclusion and discussion on
how this research can be continued by future researchers.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter Two will discuss the literature utilized in this culminating project.
The literature discussed is purely to fill potential knowledge gaps for the
discussions and arguments seen in later chapters. This will directly influence the
commentary and contributions associated to the research questions posed in
Chapter One.

Internet of Things
The deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) has become prevalent over the
course of the last few years. This is due in part to the ease of deployment and
monitoring abilities IoT can provide. IoT devices are unfortunately susceptible to
many vulnerabilities that question the effectivity of said devices on a secure
network. Establishing trust among participating devices has been a fundamental
and practical issue (Sathyadevan et al., 2019). This can be especially said of
machine-to-machine communications, which is often seen of IoT devices
(Fedrecheski et al., 2020). The same can be applied to the implementation of a
custom cryptographic protocol in a seamless wearable authentication scenario.
Both situations have established physical and computational constraints:
Storage, Random Access Memory (RAM), and battery. These limitations outline
the capabilities such a device could perform, each with caveats of increased
battery constraints, RAM buffer overflow, etc. An informal security analysis of IoT
networks revealed that traits such as confidentiality, integrity, timeliness,
4

resistance to attacks, and scalability of messages are needed to circumvent
vulnerabilities and create trust. Battery voltage and the lightweight authentication
scheme were additional factors evaluated within the security analysis. The
security analysis found the battery voltage dropping in several scenarios
involving a router and IoT device communicating while utilizing the lightweight
authentication scheme (Sathyadevan et al., 2019). This statistical information
helps to understand the balance of security and capability.

Single Sign On
Single Sign On (SSO) is an alternative authentication structure that utilizes
a trust network to authenticate a user via one means of credentials. This was
created to reduce the authentication times of users, with the inherent ability to
decrease compromised passwords. A proposed scheme of SSO utilizes
biometrics to authenticate a user (Liu et al., 2012). The goal of this scheme is to
log user samples into a system to combine biometric authentication with SSO.
This two-factor authentication (2FA) increases the level of security with this
additional requirement. SSO requires implementation of system architecture that
supports the unified approach to authentication. This requires there to be a
singular database where identity authentication can be performed. An
independent database would ensure the “independence of each function on the
platform, but also improves the security of the whole unified identity
authentication platform” (Huang & Guo, 2021, p. 70). SSO reinforces the need to
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have a common trust network to enable the shared-identity approach to
authentication.

Cryptographic Protocol Development
Developing custom cryptographic protocols becomes difficult from this
point onwards due to the security implementations that would be necessary to
include to ensure the safe transit of information. The inclusion of digital
signatures and cryptographic values gives an individual conducting a threat
analysis a method of attestation, formally known as an attestation protocol. This
process conveys hardware state, program code, and associated keys, giving
focus on the information needed for security goals within this custom protocol
(Guttman & Ramsdell, 2016). Thus, to evaluate the validity of a custom
cryptographic protocol, CPSA was developed to delineate clarity on how a
message flows through the protocol. CPSA outlines roles, message flows, and
protocol skeletons to provide visual representations of a given cryptographic
analysis (Guttman & Ramsdell, 2016). A form of cryptographic authentication
protocol can take place through this method. This cryptographic authentication
protocol can be distinct from any given method, system, or schema due to the
unique nature of custom protocols. This protocol is "a set of rules, processes, or
machines,” that are “generically [referred] to as principals” (Abadi & Needham,
1994, p. 123). These principles can be perceived as critical when discussing and
developing such a cryptographic protocol for delineation of message flow. This
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ensures stable communication and prevention of malicious activities by external
threat actors.

Wearable Authentication
Custom cryptographic protocols can be utilized in scenarios such as
seamless wearable authentication. Integrating wearable and proximity-based
authentication to a given space allows for the additional layer of convenience and
security to users. A method of authentication dubbed Zero-Effort Bilateral
Recurring Authentication (ZEBRA) set out to solve this issue (Mare et al., 2018).
This involved a user wearing a device on their wrist to track movements via
accelerometer, gyroscope, and radio that communicated movements to a
computer or workstation. The computer or workstation is to then interpret the
movements of the user through correlation analysis: If the user moves and is
near computer, stay unlocked; if user is moving but is not near computer, lock.
ZEBRA was soon superseded by Seamless Authentication using Wristbands
(SAW). This development utilized a token-based authentication within the
wristband. The job of the wristband is to communicate the proximity of a user to a
computer or workstation to not lock the user session (Mare et al., 2018).

Self-Sovereign Identity
Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is a new form of authentication that was first
seen being utilized by the bitcoin blockchain. The addition of SSI “removes the
need for a central trusted authority. Users can store their identity data on local
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devices and provide the required information to those who need it for validation
purposes” (Bokkem et al., 2019, p. 1). Platforms that utilize this type of
authentication aim to implement a “decentralized system…to store and confirm
user identity data” (Bokkem et al., 2019, p. 4). This type of information sharing
can utilize smart contacts for transactions (i.e., verifying your identity to access
an organization). With the inclusion of SSI in this information transaction,
information is easily provable, portable, and accessible. Blockchain is a perfect
foundation for SSI to build upon but is not necessarily the only way to implement
SSI. Non-Blockchain variants exist, most notably I Reveal My Attributes (IRMA).
This variant works with users to “receive digitally signed attributes from trusted
issuers like the government. This means that claims made are provable”
(Bokkem et al., 2019, p. 5). This zero-knowledge proof idea gives issuers of
digital signatures control of what can be seen and modified since issuance.
These digital signatures also can issue expiration dates and like attributes to be
collected at each authentication interval. These attributes have the inherent goal
of being as portable as possible. Without this, there will be no sense in being as
data protective as IRMA aims to be. Either forms of SSI authentication,
blockchain or non-blockchain, are valid solutions to an implementation of SSI as
a solution to create a non-centralized authentication authority.
This literature review is utilized as a generalized outline for understanding
IoT, SSO, Cryptography, Wearable Authentication, and SSI. This outline serves
as an aid for subsequent chapters when discussing constraints and related
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materials. This information again reiterates the goal of answering the posed
research questions seen within Chapter One.
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CHAPTER THREE:
WEARABLE DEVICE LIMITATIONS
Chapter Three aims to answer the question posed in Chapter One: What
are the limitations of a wearable device actively participating in a cryptographic
exchange? This chapter will cover the limitations associated to a secure
wearable device and their associated cryptographic structures. This
establishment of secure wearable device constraints provides the framing for
subsequent chapters to build upon.
Wearable devices are inherently limited due to their shape and sizes
(Mares et al., 2018). Consumers of wearable devices, such as an Apple iWatch,
Samsung Gear, and Fitbit, understand these limitations in multiple forms: How
long the battery will last on one charge, how far away you can go from your
phone before the device disconnects, and even how water resistant the device
may be. Most of this information is common knowledge as it is inscribed onto the
devices in the form of advertisements or manuals given to consumers. This sets
an expectation on how these devices are capable of functioning, so a user does
not go outside those parameters. These wearable devices function as an
extension to a cell phone or a fitness tracker, continually sending information to
and from the cellphone.
This understanding of consumer-grade wearable devices provides the
framework needed to understand what a device may and may not be capable of
doing. Sathyadevan et al. (2019) explored the possibility of end-node IoT sensors
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that are battery powered, conducting a light-weight Protean Authentication
Scheme to transmit sensor data to router-nodes securely. Sathyadevan et al.
(2019) developed a Protean Authentication Scheme in their research. This
utilized “XOR operations and also the [Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)] at
the gateway side whereas the edge nodes [would] only perform AES encryption.
Keys exchanged can either be stored in a secure EEPROM or in a memory
protected location which is not susceptible to cloning attack or memory dumps”
(Sathyadevan et al., 2019, p. 92,424). This pushed towards mitigating concerns
of “not bringing about a noticeable increase in battery consumption”
(Sathyadevan et al., 2019, p. 92,429). The limitation of battery power provides
the context for what can and cannot be computed by such a device.
Sathyadevan et al. (2019) proposed that different sleep cycles could prove
effective in increasing or decreasing the battery life of an IoT device.
Sathyadevan et al. (2019) concluded that:
In order to test the authentication scheme, the [re]MOTEs were set up as
routers as well as edge nodes. When a MOTE acts as a router it will never
go to sleep and will constantly radiate sensor values; when configured as
edge nodes, it wakes up once every 320 ms and waits for five seconds
looking out for any requests coming from the coordinator node. The
coordinator node sends out a series of requests once in four minutes
requesting sensed parameters. MOTEs will then transmit the sensed
values to the coordinator and go back to sleep. (p. 92,430)
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Therefore, IoT devices require three main things to function: Connection,
encryption, and power. These core functions are also the same as secure
wearable devices. These operational requirements call back to the need for
secure communications, where Sathyadevan et al. (2019) established the need
to “depend on the encryption…for secure communications” (p. 92,434). This
common need for security and encryption is the basis for the parallels seen
between IoT and secure wearable devices. This commonality is fluid in nature
with the inclusion of secure cryptographic communication between external
devices. While light-weight protean authentication schemes can be utilized
(Sathyadevan et al., 2019), the fluidness of cryptography allows for other modes
of cryptographic computations to take place. Single Sign On (SSO) is an
alternative form of authentication that utilizes token-based authentication and
uses organization-defined encryption algorithms. This process was created to
reduce the authentication time needed by users and to implement a simple
authentication architecture within an organization. Huang & Guo (2021), from the
article Single Sign-on Technology for Educational Administration Information
Service Platform found SSO to be “more secure than the traditional login mode”
(p. 71). Having a single commonality of authentication and encryption within both
IoT and secure wearable devices furthers the idea of both being fluid and
interchangeable.
Sathyadevan et al. (2019) conducted an experiment with and without their
proposed authentication scheme to compare battery levels after usage. Their
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results showed that there was an average power drop of 0.137504843 watts
without authentication and 0.135946529 watts with authentication. These
numbers emphasize the additional computational energy needed when utilizing
authentication on battery-operated devices, no matter how little. The researchers
experimented with their authentication scheme to confirm its efficiency. This
showed no real difference in terms of battery drainage overall but showed the
impact authentication schemes can have on IoT devices (Sathyadevan et al.,
2019, p. 92,434).
An informal security analysis was then conducted to reinforce the need for
authentication, despite the increase in electrical consumption (Sathyadevan et
al., 2019). The researchers proposed that the Protean Authentication Scheme
they developed can resist the following attacks: Replay and Known Key,
Impersonation, Device Cloning, Eavesdropping, and Man in the Middle. The
researchers believe that their proposed mechanism does “not require storing any
static key value on the device. Instead, the keys are dynamically changing and
shared securely to prevent message replay and device clone attacks”
(Sathyadevan et al., 2019, p. 92,434). This mechanism assumes this resistance
would be a beneficial outcome in the implementation of such an authentication
scheme.
These limitations slowly become a process of balancing what is and is not
needed for saving of space and/or battery power. The research conducted by
Sathyadevan et al. (2019) provides us a view of how the increase in
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computational load increases battery consumption. We can surmise that with the
increase in computational processing, the battery capacity should be increased.
This is then limited by the amount of space allowed by the design of an IoT or
wearable device. Bringing these limitations into the scope of secure wearable
authentication, a device no bigger than a typical wristwatch would be our size
limit to conform to. Mares et al. (2018) sought to establish that a “user’s
wristband (e.g., fitness tracker, smartwatch) acts as the user’s authentication
token” (p. 2). This wristband is intended to communicate securely to a target
desktop computer with little interaction of the user. The researchers assumed
that the wristband would include an “accelerometer and gyroscope sensors and a
radio (e.g., Bluetooth) to communicate to the target desktop” (Mare et al., 2018,
p. 7) to achieve this form of authentication. This form is also discussed by
Sathyadevan et al. (2019) in how there is an inherent need for balance in
computational energy and available battery capacity.
There are additional limitations surround the usage of radios. Mares et al.
(2018, p. 23) found “that Bluetooth, which is the most ubiquitous wireless
protocol for personal area networks, was not designed for complex network
topologies. As a result, pairing multiple desktops with a single wristband, or more
generally, multiple devices with multiple wristbands, can be challenging.” The
researchers found that this can be remedied with the utilization of Advanced and
Adaptive Network Technology (ANT+) or Texas Instruments SimpleLink to
“support this many-to-many connectivity in high-density environments” (Mare et
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al., 2018, p. 23). This authentication process did appear to be effective by the
researchers' own claim. They stated that “SAW proved to be quick,
authenticating participants within 2 s; effortless, and several participants liked the
natural tap authentication interaction; usable, with a low false-negative rate of
2.5%; and secure, with a low false-positive rate of 1.8% even in the most
advantageous conditions for an adversary” (Mare et al., 2018, p. 27). The
conclusion of the article reinforces the original goals of the researchers, with
security constraints requiring wearable devices to be resilient to physical
observation, accidental logins, and mimic attacks, with the addition of explicit
intent to log in. These requirements are limitations due to the impact it has on
other internal wearable device systems, such as the battery and additional power
draw over time to complete authentication.
The process of connecting is limited by the availability of current
technology, seeing ANT+, Texas Instruments SimpleLink, Wi-Fi, or Bluetooth all
being contenders in the IoT and secure wearable device use case. The scope is
further limited by the capabilities of the communication platforms. Mares et al.
(2018), found that Bluetooth simply “was not designed for complex network
topologies” (p. 23). This limitation in Bluetooth is quickly circumvented with
evidence supporting Bluetooth Low-Energy (BLE) communication. The
researchers established that “Bluetooth Low Energy, however, does not require
pairing, and indeed, supports some broadcast operations” (Mares et al., 2018, p.
23). This communication platform is then reinforced by Sathyadevan et al. (2019)
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in the mention of having BLE included on their protocol adaptors. “The hatboard
consists of the ZigBee adaptor interface and interfaces for other protocol
adapters like 6LoWPAN, BLE, WiFi etc.” (Sathyadevan et al., 2019, p. 92,429).
This interesting commonality between articles can then be applied to the mode of
communication both IoT and secure wearable devices can potentially utilize for
their communication processes.
With both IoT and secure wearable devices relying on battery-power,
there is only a limited amount of electricity available that could be utilized towards
an authentication process or network communication. The explicit amount of
power that an authentication process draws again reiterates the need to be
cautious of what processes are completed on a device. Sathyadevan et al.
(2019) concluded that an overall goal of “verify[ing] the efficiency of [the]
scheme” (p. 92,434) is necessary to continually confirm what the computational
load is at. This is to lessen or prevent preemptive drain on the battery power
made available to the device. Utilizing SSO as a form of authentication would
have a direct effect on the battery power. However, it is unknown how little or
great this power draw can be without proper testing of this authentication
scheme. The utilization of radios as a form of communication are also lumped
into this battery issue. For instance, utilizing a BLE module can have other
intricate forms of computation and battery consumption associated to it. While
BLE has “low-energy” in the name, there could be a potential increase in overall
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battery consumption with this communication platform that would otherwise deter
the want to use this format.
These parallels create the needed context to understand how IoT can
influence the future implementations and limitations of secure wearable
authentication. The requirements seen within communication, authentication, and
battery capacities emphasize the need for continual scaling of security and
stability within this platform. These requirements directly influence the capabilities
of what secure wearable authentication can achieve. Another aspect of the
authentication process is the requirement to be connected to a certificate
authority. If there was an instance there was limited connectivity to a given
authority, it would be impossible to authenticate an identity. Self-sovereign
identity would resolve this issue and is investigated in the next section on how
applicable it could be to secure wearable device authentication.

17

CHAPTER FOUR:
SECURE WEARABLE AUTHENTICATION THROUGH SSI
Chapter Four aims to answer the question posed in Chapter One: How
can the relationship between Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) and Internet of Things
(IoT) influence the future of secure wearable authentication? This chapter will
introduce SSI and provide an example on how it works overall. This will lead
directly into how SSI can influence the future of seamless authentication through
an example scenario and associated figures.

Understanding SSI
Authentication to web services is achieved through a centralized
authentication server utilizing SSO. This can be seen through using Google’s
SSO to produce a login for a third-party website, reducing the number of
duplicate usernames and passwords available on the internet. This format of
SSO is useful in that it allows for ease of use for a user, only utilizing a single
credential for authentication. The caveat to this is having no controllable limit to
what the third-party website may have access to viewing when linking said
accounts. We can theoretically trust Google with this process due to their
secured digital identity policies (Bokkem et al., 2019), but we have no control of
what we can limit in sharing. Users can refuse offering information, such as last
name or phone number, to Google. This would give Google leverage in refusing
to provide SSO services as a response.
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Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is a Decentralized Identification (DID)
concept that removes the limits on what you as a user can show or hide (Bokkem
et al., 2019). This enables unambiguous trust in the entity signing said
identification. An example of this can be seen through a driver’s license issued by
the DMV. We as a population understand that these licenses are legitimate forms
of identification and are 100% trustworthy. This example can be further applied to
when we utilize our driver’s license to verify age. The main caveat to this is that
we must show all the information on the license to whomever is verifying our age.
We do not need to show our home address, height, weight, etc., but instead just
our date of birth and the DMV signature verifying our information is legitimate.
We can achieve this through the utilization of SSI. This would increase the
amount of privacy for a user and instead obscure the information not needed to
verify our age.
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Figure 1. Decentralized Identification Model

This decentralized authentication concept can be applied to secure
wearable devices as a form of identification. Bokkem et al. (2019) identified a
user-centric authentication strategy used to store and confirm a user’s identity.
“EverID facilitates verification of users by multiple third parties and allows the
secure transfer of value between members of the network. This means that the
claims made by users are provable” (Bokkem et al., 2019, p. 4). This
authentication type requires the utilization of a blockchain. These types of
solution implementations typically involve a great deal of effort in creation for an
organization and would not be a recommended path when utilizing secure
20

wearable authentication. Non-blockchain alternatives are available and function
similarly to the previous DMV driver’s license example. I Reveal My Attributes
(IRMA) is a platform that “implements the Idemix attribute-based credential
scheme” (Bokkem et al., 2019, p. 5). This platform continues to verify that all
claims are indeed provable and can be trusted just as the blockchain variants
previously mentioned. IRMA allows users to have “control over their digital
identity. IRMA meets the (minimalization) property by using zero-knowledge
proofs. Using the issuer’s digital signature over the attributes the verifier can
verify that the attributes were given to the user in the past, and that they have not
been modified since” (Bokkem et al., 2019, p. 5). IRMA is considered extremely
portable, Bokkem et al. (2019) mentioning “users can bring their phones
wherever they want” (p. 5) to authenticate when required.
This extreme amount of portability gives secure wearable authentication
an opportunity to be utilized in conjunction with SSI to create a seamless
authentication platform. The utilization of these platforms can yield a format of
authentication conducive to ease of access previously sought after within Mares
et al. (2018). Bokkem et al. (2019) defines IRMA as not being persistent in
availability in various locations. This means “that losing your phone means losing
your identity. All the attributes need to be collected again” (Bokkem et al., 2019,
p. 5). This non-persistent decision highlights how data-protective IRMA is and
how it can be a potential benefit for sensitive environments. If a user were to lose
or misplace their secure wearable authentication device, they are forced to report
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it as they would be unable to access an organization. This pushes a user to be
responsible in protecting their device and not acting careless.
SSI can be applied in the scope of seamless authentication but should
also be approached in the scope of interoperability with established domains
within an organization. Many organizations utilize a central authentication
authority or domain to confirm the identity of users. We must define constraints to
capture what implementations may be useful in this combination of DID and
central identification structures. Bokkem et al. (2019) defines interoperability as
being widely available and not limited to certain niches. This constraint pushes
for an SSI solution that would otherwise be plug and play into a given domain.
IRMA is considered interoperable with a running trial with a third party. Bokkem
at al. (2019) provides no further information on this, but instead shows that it is
indeed possible to utilize both systems.
IoT devices have been the recent target of SSI as a preferred solution for
developing trust. Gebresilassie et al. (2020) identified IoT as having potential in
utilizing SSI. The researchers outline SSI, in a non-blockchain environment, as
allowing “IoT devices [to] prove themselves to anyone, organization, services or
other things and they have the power to decide on which portion of their identity
information to share” (p. 4). IoT devices are becoming vital parts of our
connected society in “performing autonomous decisions” (Gebresilassie et al.,
2020, p.4) in multiple environments: Industrial, homes, offices, and hospitals. SSI
is described as a preferred solution for IoT devices due to their resource

22

constraints. IoT devices utilizing SSI “have full ownership and control over their
identities via a portable, interoperable, persistent, secure, and scalable system”
(Gebresilassie et al., 2020, p. 6).
Bringing SSI to IoT addresses privacy concerns when personal data
sharing is involved. Having Personally Identifiable Information (PII) within data
causes many users to be hesitant in involving themselves with such a device for
fear of data leaks. Fedrecheski et al. (2020) stated that “the future [of] IoT will
require users to be the root of trust of their devices, leading to an owner-centric
IoT” (p. 5). The benefit of this is having inherent control over what is revealed or
transmitted. This privacy-preserving model helps to keep personal information
protected. Any communication by an IoT device is expected to “mutually
authenticate, derive short-lived symmetric keys, send encrypted messages, and
enforce non-repudiation” (Fedrecheski et al., 2020, p.5). The authors outlined
several challenges relating to this process, with device constraints being the
forefront of this issue. IoT devices have electrical and computational limitations
that are identical to what has been discussed in ‘Chapter Three: Wearable
Device Limitations.’ The authors expressed concerns regarding the
computational overhead required when adopting an “asymmetric cryptography
and cope[ing] with communication overhear of transmitting metadata, such as
DID Documents and Verifiable Credentials” (Fedrecheski et al., 2020, p. 5).
The articles written by Gebresilassie et al. (2020) and Fedrecheski et al.
(2020) outline the issues and constraints that are inherent to IoT devices. These
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same constraints can be applied directly to secure wearable authentication
devices as they follow the same criteria (i.e., battery consumption, computational
overhead, etc.). The goal of trusting a device and having full credibility to an
identity obtained by a wearable device is benefited by the utilization of SSI.
Gebresilassie et al. (2020) outlines that a “trust score algorithm in this work will
adapt the concept of the web of trust as applicable to IoT devices” (p. 5). Secure
wearable devices are easily applied to this web of trust due to the ability to adapt
the web of trust. Gebresilassie et al. (2020) continues to outline “other
parameters like minimum security requirements, reputation and compliances will
be a part of the trust score algorithm. With this trust algorithm, a device is
examined if it satisfies all the requirements before it can be granted or denied
access to the IoT networks and services” (p. 5) The same can be said when
applying this concept to secure wearable devices.

SSI Scenario Development
Secure wearable devices and SSI require a scenario to be developed to
properly convey how applicable the process can be to organizations. A fictitious
scenario can be drawn in this context to allow for proper articulation on how
National Security Agency (NSA) credentials can be used as a form of
authentication to a Navy installation. This example scenario requires three main
entities: Holder (wallet), Issuer (NSA), and Verifier (Navy). Each entity is required
to write their own DID document to the Distributed ledger / Network. Step 0
begins the process to confirm the validity of the entities to allow for a trust
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relationship to be created later. For ease in understanding the figures and their
subprocesses within the steps, parts will be labeled within the figures and
mentioned with their step number and sub-step number (ex., Step 1 plus Substep 2 will show as Step 1.2).

Figure 2. Step 0 – Preliminary Registering of DID Documents

Figure 2 outlines the preliminary steps required for an Issuer and Holder.
This process requires the NSA (Step 0.1) and the Secure Wearable Device (Step
0.2) to register their DID documents to the Distributed Ledger / Network.
Research into the possible standards for writing DID documents returned with no
results. It was then concluded that there are no current standards available for
writing DID documents. A potential format can be seen through utilization of
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JSON. Registering the NSA through a DID document could appear as seen in
figure 3.

Figure 3. NSA DID Document Registration
The “id” seen within the NSA DID document is represented with “NNNN.”
This is a unique identifier for the NSA in our example. The “public key” section
has two aspects to it: the first having an “id: did:” to identify the NSA as a DID
document and the second being “publickkeyPem” to show the public key used by
the NSA to verify claims. The “authentication” section is used to reference
authentication types seen later in a verifiable credential. This same format can be
utilized in registering a secure wearable device and is visualized in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Device DID Document Registration

The same flow of information seen in Figure 3 is mimicked for the secure
wearable device DID document in Figure 4. The “id” for our wearable device is
seen as a unique identifier of “1234” for this example. The goal of these DID
documents is to give reference to the information utilized downstream. Any
questions regarding a given authentication would route back to these
registrations. The registering of these DID documents completes step 0. Step 1
then begins by initiating a credential issuance to a holder. This process creates
Verifiable Credentials (VC) that is issued to a holder to confirm their identity. This
process is visualized in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Step 1 – Request and Issuance of Verifiable Credentials

Figure 5 shows the secure wearable device requesting a VC from NSA
(Step 1.1). This request contains the Distributed Ledger / Network information
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needed to request and retrieve information regarding the secure wearable
device. The NSA is then able to request the DID document from the Distributed
Ledger / Network with the included DID information received from the secure
wearable device (Step 1.2). The NSA can retrieve the information (Step 1.3) and
issue a DID authentication request or challenge (Step 1.4) to the secure
wearable device. A DID authentication response is then issued as the secure
wearable device confirms its identity (Step 1.5) and the NSA can issue the VC
(Step 1.6). The VC issued to the secure wearable device will follow the same
format as previously seen with DID documents but with additional information.
This is visualized in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Issued Verifiable Credentials from NSA to WD

The VC has three main structures to it: context, credential subject, and
proofs. These sections provide the credential information and arguments needed
to authenticate later in this example. This document includes information
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previously written to the Distributed Ledger / Network. The “context” section of
this VC provides the information related to the trust relationships and the given
credentials. “id” points directly to the secure wearable devices’ credentials that
can be found within the NSA database of trusted devices. The “issuer” shows
that the NSA issued the identity and was seen previously when registering the
NSA into the Distributed Ledger / Network. The “issuancedate” and “expdate” are
used to show when the credential was issued and expires. The “credential
subject” section of the VC expands the secure wearable device and the identity
involved. Common details such as “devicename,” “manufacturer,” and
“powerconsumption” are used to establish the credentials and identity seen
within the Distributed Ledger / Network. Information regarding the “securitydomain,” “security-clearance,” and “department” are used to constrain the identity
to only what may be allowed. These are modifiable by an organization on a peridentity basis. The last section of “proof” gives clarity on what “type” of
authentication signatures are used and what “proofpurpose” is available to the
identity. The “verificationmodel” is utilized in connecting the original DID
document register seen within the Distributed Ledger / Network to confirm validity
of the VC.
Step 2 initiates the Verifiable Presentation (VP) process. This allows for
the holder of an issued identity to present their VC to a verifier. The continuation
of this example has the secure wearable device holder present their issued
identity from the NSA to the Navy instillation to obtain access. The understanding
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between the NSA and Navy is that their security clearances are equal and will
have the same compartmentalization for information. Step 2 is visualized in
Figure 7.

Figure 7. Step 2 – Verifiable Presentation
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This process begins with the secure wearable device requesting access to
the Navy (Step 2.1) seen in Figure 7. The Navy will request a VP in return (Step
2.2). The information requested by the Navy can be a variety of things: name,
organization information, age, passwords, etc. These would all be things that
could otherwise be agreed upon beforehand between the NSA and Navy when
issuing identities. The secure wearable device can then compose the needed
information and provide that to the Navy as a document (Step 2.3). This
document would mimic the same format seen prior in DID documents and is
visualized in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Verifiable Presentation from WD to Navy
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The VP document will only present the information asked of it. This
example has the Navy asking only for the “securitydomain,” “security-clearance,”
and “department,” all with the associated proofs required of these credentials.
Refer to Figure 6 for the full VC. The Navy is then able to take the VP and query
the Distributed Ledger / Network (Step 2.4) with the requested information. The
headers of “id” and “verifiablecredential” direct the query to the locations where
the registered DID documents are. The Navy can retrieve the documents (Step
2.5) from the Distributed Ledger / Network. The Navy is then able to verify the
identity of the wearable device by asking the following questions:
1. Is the VC signed by NSA?
2. Is the VP prepared and signed by WD?
3. What is the identity of Holder who prepared and submitted the VP?
The Navy can confirm the validity of number 1 since it has the NSA public key
from the DID document retrieved from the Distributed Ledger / Network.
Numbers 2 and 3 can follow the same route of confirmation as number 1 as it
has the WD public key. It is at this point that the Navy can create a trust
relationship with the secure wearable device after confirming questions 1, 2 and
3. This creates a triangle of trust, establishing a basis to which the Navy can then
admit the secure wearable device to their network (Step 2.6).
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Secure wearable devices are limited by size, computational capacity, and
battery storage. The reasonings of why these limitations exist were approached
within ‘Chapter Three: Wearable Device Limitations.’ This chapter established
that the addition of an authentication scheme adds additional battery
consumption with the increase of computations required to process a scheme.
SSI can also be utilized as a form of authentication for secure wearable devices
and was discussed within ‘Chapter Four: Secure Wearable Authentication
Through SSI and IoT.’ This authentication form gives way for a multi-level
authentication in environments that require it. SSI conveys the information
required without the need to process additional data. Blockchain and nonblockchain variants exist and are available to anyone utilizing SSI as a form of
authentication and developer of trust. It is then surmised that SSI could
potentially reduce the overall battery consumption, but formalized research was
limited only to the development of an example scenario involving the introduction
to SSI into an environment.
Future research into this topic should explore the possibility of developing
a working model of SSI as a form of seamless wearable authentication to an
organization. It is recommended that the working model follow a generalized
approach to allow for ease in scaling and implementation into participating
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organizations. Other avenues of this research could reach into other trust
networks being developed and how they could be applied to this scenario.
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